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Criminal Homicide
2C:11-2.
A person is guilty of
criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the
circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5,
causes the death of another human being.
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.
Murder
2C:11-3.
a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4,
criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (1) The actor purposely
causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (2) The
actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in
death; or (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or
with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit
robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking,
criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26
(C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such
crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of
a person other than one of the participants; except that in any
prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the
only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense
that the defendant: (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way
solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission
thereof; and (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any
instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public
places by law-abiding persons; and (c) Had no reasonable ground to
believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon,
instrument, article or substance; and (d) Had no reasonable ground to
believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct
likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
b. (1) Murder
is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall
be sentenced, except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of
this subsection, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the
person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific
term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of
which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for
parole.
(2) If the
victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing
his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law
enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be
sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which
the person shall not be eligible for parole.
(3) A person
convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment
without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all
of the following circumstances: (a) The victim is less than 14 years
old; and (b) The act is committed in the course of the commission,
whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2
or N.J.S.2C:14-3.
(4) Any person
convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal
act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the
commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything
of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking
network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in
furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3,
commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the
offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime
of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall
be sentenced by the court to life imprisonment without eligibility for
parole, which sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison,
if a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the following
aggravating factors exist: (a) The defendant has been convicted, at
any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a
conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be
used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;
(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or
knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition
to the victim; (c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated assault to the victim; (d) The defendant committed the
murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the
receipt of anything of pecuniary value; (e) The defendant procured the
commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything
of pecuniary value; (f) The murder was committed for the purpose of
escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for
another offense committed by the defendant or another; (g) The murder
was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping,
carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of N.J.S.2C:29-9b.;
(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1,
while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official
duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant; (i) The
defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as
defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance
of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3,
committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission
of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a
leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3
in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
(j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in
violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;
(k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or (l) The murder was
committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to
section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2).
(5) A juvenile
who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall be
sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.
c. through h.
(Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204).
i. For purposes
of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that
causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.
j. In a
sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display
of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be
permitted.
Manslaughter
2C:11-4. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated
manslaughter when: (1) The actor recklessly
causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
human life; or (2) The actor causes the death of another person while
fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation
of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2.
Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the
actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon
proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2
which resulted in the death of another person. As used in this
paragraph, "actor" shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.
b. Criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (1) It is committed
recklessly; or (2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under
section 2C:11-3. is committed in the heat
of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.
c. Aggravated
manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a
crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may,
notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of
N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary
term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter
under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the
first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.
Death by Auto or Vessel
2C:11-5.
a. Criminal homicide constitutes vehicular homicide
when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.
Proof that the defendant
fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without
sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to
an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the
defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50
or was operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in
violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46)
shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving
recklessly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way
limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute
driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.
b. Except as
provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, vehicular homicide is a
crime of the second degree.
(1) If the
defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence
of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or
habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or
above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50,
or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his
driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for
any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of
P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the
Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85
(C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a
violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of
imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The
minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of
the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is
greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.
(2) The court
shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a
hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing,
the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the
influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or
habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or
above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50
or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his
driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for
any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of
P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the
Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85
(C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a
violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its
findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence,
testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other
court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and
any other relevant information.
(3) Vehicular
homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating
the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50
or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a)
while: (a) on any school property used for school purposes which is
owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school
board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property; (b) driving
through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1
if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the
school crossing as such; or (c) driving through a school crossing as
defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that
juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the
school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.
A map or true copy of a map
depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000
feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or
leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced
pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7)
may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.
It shall be no
defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of
this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited
conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school
property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a
defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this
paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or
crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in
session.
(4) If the defendant was
operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50
or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a),
the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended
for a period of between five years and life, which period shall
commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that
person.
c. For good
cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this
section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil
proceeding.
d. Nothing
herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an
indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the
provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4.
As used in this
section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance propelled
otherwise than by muscular power.
e. Any person
who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall
forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense,
unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at
the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such
forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the
defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the
defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take
judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at
the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also
consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.
Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and
not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this title.
Aiding Suicide
2C:11-6.
A person who purposely aids another to commit suicide is guilty of a
crime of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an
attempted suicide, and otherwise of a crime of the fourth degree.
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